The Colombian Conflict: Uribe's First 17 Months by Spagat, M & Restrepo, J
 1 
The Colombian Conflict: Uribe’s First 17 Months 1 
 
By 
 
Jorge Restrepo 
Department of Economics 
Royal Holloway College 
University of London 
J.Restrepo@rhul.ac.uk 
 
And  
 
Michael Spagat 
Department of Economics 
Royal Holloway College 
University of London 
Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX 
UK 
M.Spagat@rhul.ac.uk 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Analysis of our  new, 16-year dataset on the Colombian civil war 
finds under Uribe: guerrilla and paramilitary attacks dropping 
sharply to long-run averages since 1988, lower for April-
December, 2003; government-guerrilla clashes at all-time highs, 
exceeding guerrilla attacks; civilian killings dropping sharply 
and continuously to all-time lows, mainly from decreased 
paramilitary attacks; combatant killings rising sharply to all- time 
highs; guerrilla tactics shifting toward indiscriminate attacking, 
forcing civilian injuries to long-run highs; government-to-
guerrilla casualty ratios in clashes falling; government-
paramilitary clashes increasing but still uncommon; paramilitary 
performance in clashes poor and worsening; guerrilla-
paramilitary clashes dropping sharply; the ELN seriously 
weakened, mounting  few attacks. 
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1 We base our analysis on a database which we built with the significant contribution of Juan Fernando 
Vargas.  Andrés Dávila, Malcolm Deas, Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín, Madelyn Hicks, Anne Sophie 
Linder, Michael Mandler, Eduardo Posada Carbó, Enrique López Enciso and Juan Fernando Vargas 
have all provided us with very thoughtful comments on a preliminary draft of the paper.  We also 
benefited from seminar participants at CEDE-Universidad de los Andes, Fedesarrollo, IEPRI-
Universidad Nacional de Colombia and DNP-National Planning Department of Colombia. Restrepo 
acknowledges financial support from Banco de la República.  We thank the RSF fund of Royal 
Holloway and Centra l Research Fund of the University of London for funding this project.  
Responsibility for any errors remains our own.  
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1. Introduction 
Colombia is important, both for its 44 million people and for the wider world.  Apart 
from the large human and economic toll the conflict imposes on Colombia, the 
country’s illegal armed groups, left-wing guerrillas, right-wing paramilitaries and 
narcotraffickers are at the heart of the world cocaine trade.  They have spawned a 
huge displaced person population, are a source of instability for the Andean region 
and have developed sophisticated arms trafficking networks.2  Colombia received 
nearly $2.5 billion in US aid from 2000 through 2003, and the US commitment is 
expected to hold above $700 million annually over the next two years (Center for 
International Policy, 2004).  Most of this aid has been aimed at combating the 
narcotics business but the US has been moving tentatively toward more direct 
counterinsurgency support.  It is, therefore, vital to the US to understand what kind of 
a partner it has in the Colombian government and society.  Domestically, there is 
great interest in assessing the security policy implemented by the present Colombian 
Government, as it constitutes the largest military offensive ever against the guerrillas 
waging war against the Colombian state.3   From a purely academic point of view, it is 
interesting to study the responses of the armed groups in the country to this dramatic 
policy change. 
 Álvaro Uribe assumed the presidency of Colombia on August 7, 2002, riding a 
wave of general dissatisfaction with the country’s increasingly violent conflict.  The 
urban population was experiencing an unusually high level of personal insecurity and, 
                                                 
2 Marcela (2003) and Cragin and Hoffman (2003) make persuasive cases for the importance of 
Colombia to the outside world.  Nevertheless, we do not single out Colombia as the primary regional 
problem in the Andes as Council on Foreign Relations (2004) appears to do.  If fact, one could argue 
that Colombia is currently causing less negative spillover for the region than most, and possibly all, of 
its neighbours.   
3 There is controversy regarding classification of the Colombian conflict and whether it is indeed a civil 
war.  Posada (2001) is an interesting treatment of this question.  We, however, follow conventional 
political science methodology and use civil war terminology since the conflict’s killing rates and other 
characteristics fit those used in that literature to define civil war. 
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after the failed peace process of the previous government, voters supported a hard- line 
stance against the illegal armed groups.  Uribe forged a strong connection to voters 
with his tough approach, promising to take the fight to the enemy and produce results.  
Since election, Uribe’s popularity has grown in Colombia where he enjoys a 79% 
approval rating, benefiting from a widespread perception that his government has 
made life safer and put the insurgent groups under fire (Invamer-Gallup, 2004).   
 Uribe’s security approach is generally known as the Democratic Security 
Policy, an ambitious plan to gain control over lawless territories and provide security 
to all sectors of society based on an expanded military and police presence and the 
creation of networks of civilian support.4  The core objective is to extend the rule of 
law to all parts of the country, even the most remote ones.  Notably, the government 
views counterinsurgency as a task for the whole society, rather than a chore to be 
delegated to the military.  Some specific policies, such as the rollback of conscription 
and the professionalization of the military, are extensions of previous reforms pursued 
over the last decade.  But much is new.  For example, the government has established 
National Police presence in all major townships, many of which lacked police for 
decades.  The government expanded the number of rural police corps, created new 
battalions of peasant-soldiers who train and serve near their homes and built an 
extensive network of civilian informants. 
 The Democratic Security Policy is extremely popular with most of the 
Colombian population (Invamer-Gallup, 2004) and highly regarded in Colombian and 
American military circles (e.g., Marcella, 2003).  Nevertheless, it has drawn some 
strong criticism.  For example, ICG (2003) argues that Uribe’s policy excessively 
                                                 
4 The government’s exposition of this policy in English is Presidency of the Republic and Ministry of 
Defence, 2003.  Pizarro (2003a) is an independent and favourable evaluation and ICG (2003) is an 
unfavourable one.  We are struck by the resemblance of Uribe’s plan to recommendations made by 
military analysts (Nuñez, 2001, Spencer, 2001 and Marks, 2002), especially its emphasis on local and 
civilian participation.   
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emphasizes a military approach while neglecting poverty, inequality and human 
rights.  Mass detentions of people suspected, based on local informants’ statements, of 
supporting the guerrillas have created huge controversy and even a rebuke from the 
Procurator General (El Tiempo, 2004b).  Some analysts have criticized the informant 
networks as generating spurious evidence against innocent people who then, after 
release, become potential targets of right-wing paramilitaries.  Some also argue that 
the existence of locally based armed units exposes isolated communities to guerrilla 
retaliation.  The Uribe government has faced particularly fierce censure from human 
rights organizations and has sometimes responded with angry rebuttals, including 
from Uribe himself.5  We believe that this polemical environment has obscured some 
of the underlying facts about the conflict and we hope that our paper will contribute to 
more fruitful future discussions.   
 
2. The Data Source 
Our analysis is based on the dataset presented in Restrepo, Spagat and Vargas (2003).  
This is the first time-series dataset for the Colombian civil war that is detailed (close 
to 20,000 events), high-frequency and long.  It allows analysis of the actions of all 
participants in the Colombian conflict over more than 16 years.  Our database records 
a set of characteristics for each event: date; location (township and department); 
whether or not there was a clash; the groups involved; whether or not there was an 
attack; the type of attack; the group(s) responsible; killings; and injuries.6  We have 
                                                 
5See, for example, Human Rights Watch (2004), United States Institute of Peace (2004), Amnesty 
International (2003) and WOLA (2003).  From Colombia see Comisión Colombiana de Juristas (2003) 
and the introduction and chapter 11 of Colombian Platform for Human Rights, Democracy and 
Development (2003). 
6 In our terminology clashes require fighting between at least two groups while attacks are uncontested 
events. 
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now extended the database to include Uribe’s first 17 months and are, therefore, in a 
unique position to assess the work of his government. 
 Restrepo, Spagat and Vargas (2003) describes in detail the construction of our 
dataset so we will only summarize its main characteristics briefly here.  We build the 
database using events listed in the annexes to the periodicals Justicia y Paz and Noche 
y Niebla published quarterly by the Colombian NGO'S CINEP and the Comisión 
Intercongregacional de Justicia y Paz (hereafter, CINEP).  CINEP uses this 
information in its reports, focusing on the measurement of human rights violations, 
violations to international humanitarian law and political violence, connected or not 
with the conflict.  We, on the other hand, are interested in civil war dynamics.  
Therefore, CINEP’s database organization and statistical analysis are entirely 
inappropriate for our purposes.  Fortunately, the raw information they provide is so 
extensive that we can distil from it just its war-relevant components.  Working from 
the detailed list of events published in the annexes to the reports, we identify and code 
events following our own criteria designed to include all conflict events and only 
those events. 
 In the original dataset and in our quarterly updates we follow a stringent 
quality control regime in cleaning the data that proceeds in four stages, covering both 
event inclusion and the coding of events.  First, we randomly sample a large number 
of events and check against the CINEP source that they are properly included and 
coded.  Second, we randomly sample events, look up these events in press archives 
and again verify our inclusion and coding.  This is a test both of the transfer of 
information from the CINEP source to our database and of the quality of the CINEP 
raw information itself, which turns out to be high.  Third, we find all the major events 
in the dataset and carefully investigate each one in the press record.  Finally, we 
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compare lists of significant events from other sources with our data, such as Human 
Rights Watch and Colombian government reports, occasionally adding events after 
thoroughly investigating them ourselves.   
 We wish to stress three points about our data.  First, the dataset is independent 
of government figures, since the primary source is CINEP periodicals.  Some people 
accuse CINEP, and other NGO’s that use their figures, of left-wing bias.  In 
particular, some accuse these groups of discounting the violations of guerrilla groups 
and of overstating the violations of government forces.7  In fact, we agree that many 
CINEP publications seem to interpret the Colombian government in a distrustful, 
suspicious manner.  Nevertheless, our team has spent many months pouring over 
CINEP’s raw data and performing extensive quality checks, and we are convinced of 
the integrity of the raw database.  Moreover, since our numbers turn out to be rather 
favourable to the Uribe administration, any readers sceptical of our quality assurances 
should still remain confidant in our main findings. 
 Second, our data go all the way back to 1988 so we are able to offer a long 
perspective on the conflict.  This feature is important because several changes over 
the past year are dramatic when compared to the previous few years, but really just 
represent returns to long-run averages.  A short-term view of the conflict, 
concentrating on annual rates of change of some criminality and armed-forces-
operations variables, has pervaded press reports, government evaluations, editorial 
comments and the work of analysts in Colombia.  This practice is understandable in 
the absence of a long-term series, but it gives an incomplete view of the conflict and 
its evolution that we hope to remedy with our work. 
                                                 
7 See, for example, O’Grady (2004) which is based on a report from the US Embassy in Colombia.  
They argue that CINEP and other human rights NGO’s overstate the true level of human rights 
violations and bias their figures against the government and in favour of the guerrillas, for example, by 
counting a single event as violating human rights multiple times and by following the legal convention 
of defining human rights in such a way that they can only be breached by a government authority. 
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 Third, the data focus on the conflict narrowly defined and cannot give a full 
picture of Colombia and the conflict.  In this paper we restrict ourselves almost 
exclusively to analysing our data since this is what we are uniquely positioned to do.  
We do not, however, wish to imply that the issues we address are the only important 
ones.  For example, we do not assess overall changes in human rights or political 
liberties as a result of Uribe’s policies.  On the other hand, since our data focus on 
issues of life and death and the struggle for power we do think we are addressing 
some of the most important issues facing Colombia today.   
 Fourth, we analyze only national trends.  Colombia has a complex and varied 
topography, including extensive mountains and jungles, so conflict conditions do vary 
considerably by location.  Our findings are very strong, so the national trends we 
identify should generally reflect those of most regions.  Nevertheless, some regions 
might not conform well to our description of events.  
 
 
3. Background 
We now provide a succinct background on the conflict, including all the main actors 
in the dataset.8  Apart from the La Violencia period (1946-66) in which the country 
was split along the lines of the Liberal and Conservative parties, fighting has been 
mostly between several guerrilla groups and government forces with the more recent 
participation of paramilitary forces also fighting against the guerrillas.  The origin of 
the guerrilla groups can be traced back to leftist peasant self-defence organizations 
aligned with the Liberal party, even before La Violencia.  There are two significant 
guerrilla groups currently active in Colombia.  The Armed Revolutionary Forces of 
                                                 
8 Rabasa and Chalk (2001) and Safford and Palacios (2002, ch.  14) give recent overviews of the 
conflict, including discussions of the origins and conduct of the main parties in our dataset. 
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Colombia (FARC, in its Spanish acronym) was founded in 1964 after the government 
ordered an attack on one of the partisan self-defence agrarian movements that had 
originated in La Violencia.  Today the FARC is estimated to have between 16,000 and 
20,000 combatants, making it the largest guerrilla group in the world.  The second 
largest guerrilla group in Colombia is the National Liberation Army (ELN), which 
was founded in 1965 with support from the Cuban government.  The ELN faced a 
profound crisis during the eighties but was reborn, thanks mainly to extortion of 
multinational companies trading in natural resources.  The ELN is thought to have 
from 4,000 to 6,000 combatants.  These guerrilla groups are largely rural and follow 
typical guerrilla tactics in a protracted conflict, attacking mainly fixed government 
positions and public infrastructure.  On several occasions the FARC and ELN entered 
into peace talks with the government, most recently during a three and a half year 
period under the government of Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002) leading to the 
demilitarization of a large zone in the south of the country known as the Despeje. 
The paramilitary groups are for the most part gathered under the umbrella 
alliance United Self-Defence Groups of Colombia (AUC), which was formally 
created in 1997, although paramilitary groups and self-defence organizations can be 
traced back to the late seventies (Pizarro, 2003b).  In the late eighties and early 
nineties these groups acquired notoriety due to strong links with the narcotraffic 
cartels.  1994 marked a turning point for the paramilitaries because that was when 
records indicate that they first began localized operations against guerrilla groups.  
Within a few years the paramilitaries became a major factor in the conflict.  In 
December, 2003 the AUC declared a unilateral truce and later started demobilization 
talks with the government. 
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Government forces include the military (army, navy, and air force), the 
National Police (in charge of internal security and normal policing duties) and other 
small security corps like the security service (DAS).  The National Police are in 
charge of what is known in military and security terms as “paramilitary” operations in 
which forces, usually armed with automatic weapons, conduct long-term internal 
security operations, without large numbers of operatives and without the use of 
artillery.  These actors must be distinguished from what we call “paramilitary” groups 
in our dataset as the latter neither belong to the institutional apparatus nor are under 
the command and control of the state. 
Our dataset allows us to pick up the story in 1988.  Although there is 
significant continuity of actors in the conflict going back to the 1950s, in terms of 
both intensity and qualitative characteristics the last 16 years can be considered a 
valid unit of analysis.  Our dataset includes the hottest period of war while allowing a 
significant degree of historical perspective.   
 
4. Summary Measures 
We first explain a vital piece of our terminology: the difference between clashes and 
attacks.  We define a clash as a direct encounter between two or more groups of 
armed individuals that results in armed combat.  We define an attack as a violent 
event in which there is no mutual, armed combat between two groups.  In other 
words, attacks are one-sided events such as massacres of civilians, antipersonnel mine 
detonations, terrorist incidents, acts of sabotage such as blowing up a bridge or an oil 
pipeline and aerial bombardments.  Clashes are fights involving at least two groups.9 
                                                 
9 For more details on our methodology and coding criteria see Restrepo, Spagat and Vargas (2003). 
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 One striking feature of the data is that there are very large changes in the 
variables during the period just before and just after Uribe’s inauguration, reflecting 
the influence of several factors.  First, violence levels were very high at the beginning 
of 2002.  A large increase in the number of guerrilla attacks beginning in December 
2001 was followed by the collapse of the peace process at the end of February, 
immediately leading to a big military offensive by the government into the Despeje 
zone.  Second, in 2002 the guerrillas interfered extensively in the parliamentary 
elections in March, the presidential elections in May and the presidential inauguration 
in August.  Third, after inauguration the swift implementation of the Democratic 
Security Policy increased the morale of the troops and created a new, more offensive 
environment in the military.  Finally, the paramilitary truce starting December, 2002 
is reflected in the data. 
 Figure 1 gives the total number of casualties, i.e., killings and injuries, in the 
war.  Following Restrepo, Spagat and Vargas (2003) we designate 1996 as the 
beginning of an “upsurge” period in the conflict.  The line labelled “upsurge” in the 
figure ends when Uribe took office.  We see a dramatic decline in killings under Uribe 
compared to the peak of early 2002.  Table 1 shows monthly killings for time periods 
designated “Uribe”, “late upsurge”, “entire upsurge”, “Despeje” and “previous to 
Uribe”.  Killing rates remain much higher than their long-run averages (i.e., previous 
to Uribe), somewhat lower than in the late upsurge period but above those for both the 
Despeje and the upsurge period as a whole.  There is no contradiction between the 
strong decline in killings shown in figure 1 and the increase in killings in most of the 
comparisons from table 1, because the peak in early 2002, highlighted in the figure, 
was short- lived whereas the table averages over relatively long time periods.  Figure 1 
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also shows wild fluctuation in the injury rate under Uribe.  However, the average 
monthly injury rate is at a historic high under Uribe (table 1).   
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Figure 1. Quarterly number of people killed and injured in conflict events 
 
Table 1.  Attacks and Casualties per Month by Period
Uribe Government "Despeje" period Previous to Uribe
8/2002 – 12/2003 1/1999 – 7/2002 1/1996 – 7/2002 10/1998 - 2/2002 1/1988 – 7/2002
People Killed 259 269 219 255 175
People Injured 140 124 109 119 85
Guerrilla Attacks 54 76 65 71 53
Paramilitary Attacks 7 21 12 16 7
Periods
Upsurge                                                       
Late                           Entire
  
 Guerrilla and paramilitary strategies both emphasize attacks while the 
government generally prefers clashes to attacks.  Thus, the sharp drop in both 
guerrilla and paramilitary attacks under Uribe displayed in figure 2 is very good news.  
Government attacks have remained steady and at a low level.10  Table 1 shows that 
                                                 
10 Government attacks are mostly aerial bombardments and antinarcotics and antikidnapping operations 
that are usually unopposed.   
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under Uribe both guerrilla and paramilitary attacks have been much lower than in the 
late upsurge period and lower than the average for the whole upsurge period and for 
the Despeje period, when the government was negotiating with the guerrillas.  
Nevertheless, attacks remain around their long-run averages before Uribe.  On the 
other hand, the strong downward trend of figure 2 clearly indicates that in the last 
three quarters of 2003 the attack rates for both the guerrillas and the paramilitaries fell 
well below long-run averages.  This would be a breakthrough if it can be maintained.  
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Figure 2. Quarterly number of attacks by group 
 
Figure 3 shows the evolution over time of the number of clashes each of the 
three sides has participated in.  Levels for the government and the guerrillas are 
holding near all-time highs while clashes involving paramilitaries have plummeted.  
Accordingly, the gap between government and guerrilla clashes has closed, as there 
must be at least two sides to any clash.   
The combined effect of figures 2 and 3 could create a misperception that 
paramilitaries have been minor players in the conflict.  However, we will show below 
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that a disproportionately large number of people have been killed in the relatively 
small number of conflict events in which the paramilitaries have participated.  So the 
paramilitaries are important. 
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Figure 3. Quarterly number of clashes by group 
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Figure 4. Quarterly number of clashes and attacks 
 
Figure 4 shows that the Uribe government, building on an increase in clashes 
that began in 1999, has managed to push the number of clashes to slightly above the 
number of attacks for the first time since 1988.  Table 2 assesses the impact of this 
change by listing the number of killings and injuries in both types of events for the 
time periods from table 1.  Killings in attacks and the number of attacks mirror each 
other quite closely between the two tables.  Injuries per attack, on the other hand, are 
at an all-time high under Uribe.  In fact, as the attack rate has reverted to its long-run 
average the injury rate has risen to more than double its long-run average.  This 
reflects a strong rise in indiscriminate guerrilla attacks including urban terrorism, the 
use of crude gas-canister mortars and antipersonnel landmines.  In clashes, the 
monthly killing rate under Uribe is at an all-time high while the corresponding injury 
rate has dropped to about its long-run average.   
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Table 2.  Monthly Casualty Rates for Attacks and Clashes for Various Time Periods
Uribe Government "Despeje" period Previous to Uribe
8/2002 – 12/2003 1/1999 – 7/2002 1/1996 – 7/2002 10/1998 - 2/2002 1/1988 – 7/2002
Killings in attacks 80 127 103 131 82
Injuries in attacks 95 74 62 72 49
Killings in clashes 68 58 50 54 38
Injuries in clashes 15 23 23 23 16
Periods
Upsurge                                                       
Late                           Entire
 
  
 Figure 5 depicts the main series only from 1996 onwards, thereby magnifying 
recent movements.  The extent of the decline in killings from its peak, the most 
important intensity measure for the conflict, is readily apparent here.  The figure also 
draws out the fact that the slow but continuous increase in clashes faltered slightly 
since Uribe’s inauguration.  This is due, as we shall see, to the government not fully 
compensating for the decrease in paramilitary-guerrilla clashes.  The almost 
continuous fall in the attack rate since the peak in March 2002 is also clear. 
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Figure 5. Quarterly conflict activity since 1996 
 
5. Civilian Casualties 
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Figure 6 and Table 3 indicate that civilian killings have dropped sharply during 
Uribe’s first months in office in comparison with all our categories, even to well 
below the long-run average before Uribe.11  On the other hand, civilian injury rates 
are at all- time highs.  This reflects the guerrillas’ new practice of indiscriminately 
targeting civilians. 
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Figure 6. Quarterly number of civilians killed and injured in conflict events 
 
Table 3.  Monthly Casualty Rates for Various Time Periods
Uribe Government "Despeje" period Previous to Uribe
8/2002 – 12/2003 1/1999 – 7/2002 1/1996 – 7/2002 10/1998 - 2/2002 1/1988 – 7/2002
Civilians Killed 52 114 85 114 62
Civilians Injured 82 63 46 57 31
Combatants Killed 207 155 134 141 113
Combatants Injured 58 61 63 62 54
Periods
Upsurge                                                       
Late                           Entire
 
 
                                                 
11 One of the main strengths of our data is that it includes casualties of the war without mixing in 
ordinary homicides.  Nevertheless, we note that the full homicide rate in Colombia has decreased by 
about 20% under Uribe following a trend that began in 1997 and to which the cities of Medell ín and 
Bogotá have contributed significantly.  Therefore, the improvement in war-related civilian killing is 
matched by a general improvement in the homicide rate.  There have also been big declines in other 
key indicators such as kidnappings and forced displacement, but we do not integrate these statistics into 
our discussion because we have no new information on these phenomena. 
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Table 3 immediately yields another interesting fact: under Uribe Colombia has 
become safer for civilians but not for combatants.12  Combatant casualties are running 
much higher even than during the late upsurge period and far above long-run averages 
before Uribe.  This is entirely consistent with table 2, as most combatant casualties 
occur during clashes.  To summarize, the war is hot, but the pressure on civilians has 
been reduced.  Of course, many civilians are still being killed and injured, so we now 
pursue this issue further.   
 Figure 7 shows civilian killings organized by group involved.  This picture 
must be interpreted with care because many conflict events involve multiple 
participants and, therefore, apportioning blame is tricky, often requiring detailed 
information.  For example, in a clash between guerrillas and paramilitaries in which 
civilians are killed some may have been killed by combatants on each side, the clash 
might have been initiated by guerrillas in retaliation for an earlier paramilitary attack 
and there may exist multiple credible but contradictory accounts of the event.  Figure 
7 avoids these complicated issues.  The government curve simply records the number 
of civilians killed each quarter in events involving the government.  Similarly the 
paramilitary and guerrilla curves represent civilians killed each quarter in events 
involving paramilitaries and guerrillas respectively.  Thus, a civilian killed in a clash 
between guerrillas and government forces will appear in the curves for both the 
guerrillas and the government and the figure cannot be used to attribute definite blame 
to either side.   
 Figure 7 shows that civilian killings in recent years have occurred primarily in 
events involving the paramilitaries and secondarily in events with guerrilla 
participation.  The government has always been rather disconnected from civilian 
                                                 
12 The definition of combatant under international law is complicated but to a first approximation turns 
on proven membership in a conflict organisation or the wearing of an identifiable uniform or marking.   
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killing.  It is, therefore, not surprising to learn that the drop in civilian killing under 
Uribe derives mainly from decreased paramilitary involvement and secondarily from 
less guerrilla involvement in civilian killing.  Decreased paramilitary activity makes 
sense since the AUC has been officially on ceasefire since December 2003.  
Nevertheless, the paramilitaries remain active, having involvement  in 24 civilian 
killings per month from the beginning of the ceasefire period until the end of 2003.  In 
fact, during the ceasefire there have been 856 conflict-related killings in events 
involving the paramilitaries.  Subtracting off the 477 of these that were paramilitary 
members, this averages out to 29 killings per month.  These figures are not wildly 
inconsistent with the claim, widely circulated in February 2004, that the paramilitaries 
have killed 600 people since going on ceasefire.13  Also interesting is the breakdown 
of monthly killings in paramilitary- involved conflict events during the ceasefire: 37 
paramilitaries, 24 civilians and 5 non-paramilitary combatants, not a picture of 
success.   
 Despite the violations, paramilitary activity really has decreased continuously 
during the demobilization discussions.  This is in striking contrast with FARC 
behaviour when it negotiated with the Pastrana government while its attack rates were 
rising toward all- time highs.  Isacson (2003) considers the possibility that the FARC 
might have been split into some potential peacemakers and others trying to sabotage 
peace efforts.  We find this implausible, given the broad increase in FARC attacks 
during the peace negotiations, suggesting high- level FARC approval for the general 
trend.  Recent AUC behaviour strikes us as a much better fit for a theory of split 
                                                 
13 See El Tiempo (2004a) and  El Colombiano (2004).  Without committing to a specific figure the 
United Nations also considers the paramilitaries to be in breach of the ceasefire: see Villelabeitia  
(2004).  The government itself recently provided figures for paramilitary violations of the ceasefire and 
a summary of reports that it has received from third parties (High Commissioner for Peace, 2004). 
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leadership: a strong decrease in overall activity but with numerous violations.  As the 
demobilisation talks have consolidated, the reduction in killings has deepened.   
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Figure 7. Quarterly number of civilians killed in conflict events by group 
involved 
 
 The paramilitaries injure relatively few people, a little-appreciated but vital 
fact about the Colombian conflict.  Over the whole period of our dataset the three 
groups have established the following ratios of killed civilians to injured civilians in 
events in which they have participated: 1.0 for the guerrillas, 1.1 for the government 
and 10.2 for the paramilitaries!  We take this as an indication that most civilian 
casualties perpetrated by the paramilitaries are intentional killings rather than 
“collateral damage” of operations aimed at other objectives.  This observation points 
to another reason why injuries have not followed killings in a steep decline under 
Uribe; the sharp drop in paramilitary activity does not translate into a big decrease in 
civilian injuries because the paramilitaries never were the biggest factor in causing 
civilian injuries. 
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 In figure 8 we pursue the question of blame for civilian killings by presenting 
civilian killings in attacks by group, thus restricting ourselves to events with only a 
single participating group.  The idea is that clashes involve at least two groups and, 
hence, potential confusion over responsibility for casualties, but in attacks there is 
only one fighting group and responsibility is unambiguous.14  Figure 8 is consistent 
with figure 7.  Again, paramilitaries emerge as the biggest killers of civilians in recent 
years and the improvement in civilian safety derives mainly from the large and 
continuous decrease in paramilitary conflict activity.  Note that guerrilla killings of 
civilians have not diminished at all in recent years.   
 Figure 9 gives injuries in attacks and differs significantly from figure 8.  First, 
it shows the guerrillas as the main perpetrators rather than the paramilitaries.  Second, 
while government-caused and paramilitary-caused injuries have decreased from low 
levels, guerrilla-caused injuries are running at extremely high levels. 
 The above discussion runs strongly counter to many reports of mushrooming 
human rights violations by the Uribe government (footnote 5).  This is partly 
explained by our exclusive focus on killings and injuries during conflict activities 
while the human rights organizations consider a much wider range of rights during 
conflict and non-conflict related events.  Vital for the thesis of an increase in 
violations is the classification of many mass detentions as human rights violations, a 
point that can be and has been argued, even by the Colombian Procurator General (El 
Tiempo, 2004b).  But there are two further common practices of government critics 
that are difficult, in our view, to justify.  First, they produce and stress a number for 
total human rights abuses that simply adds up different kinds of violations including 
killings and mass arrests on equal terms, distorting the overall assessment of 
                                                 
14 Naturally, figure 7 omits many civilian killings so we have bought clear responsibility at the cost of 
comprehensiveness of coverage. 
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government actions and its effects on the population.  There can be no single correct 
way of balancing one type of human rights violation against another but it is hard to 
defend simply adding up killings and detentions as if they are equally serious 
violations.  Second, some NGOs (e.g., Comisión Colombiana de Juristas, 2003) also 
have been reporting huge increases in unverifiable indicators, such as the number of 
threats under Uribe, which could be true but must be treated with caution. 
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Figure 8. Quarterly number of civilians killed in attacks by group 
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Figure 9. Quarterly number of civilians injured in attacks by group 
6.   Combatant Casualties 
Figure 10 gives total casualties (killings plus injuries) in events in which the 
government has participated.  It shows that, beginning several years before Uribe 
assumed office, government casualties began to decrease while guerrilla casualties 
rose to long-run highs.   
 On the other hand, aside from an anomalous event in the middle of 2002, the 
paramilitaries barely register as a government target until an increasing trend appears 
during the last three quarters of 2003.  This is partly explained by the fact that the 
paramilitaries have often simply surrendered to the government when challenged 
rather than fight.  Nevertheless, in terms of military strategy, the government clearly 
does not treat the paramilitaries symmetrically compared to the guerrillas.  It is, of 
course, not surprising that the government has always directed vastly more resources 
at fighting the guerrillas than it has at combating paramilitarism.  After all, the 
guerrillas are working to overthrow the State whereas the paramilitaries, however 
unwelcome they may be, share the State’s goal of preventing this outcome.  In fact, 
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Marks (2002) specifically recommends a counterinsurgency approach of first 
defeating the guerrillas before going after the paramilitaries.  Nevertheless, given the 
paramilitaries record of killing civilians one could certainly argue that the government 
approach has been excessively lopsided.  In this context, we are quite interested in the 
tentative trend for government forces to clash increasingly with paramilitary groups 
that are not respecting the declared AUC ceasefire.   
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Figure 10. Quarterly number of government-related casualties 
 
 Figure 11 shows casualties by group in events in which the guerrillas 
participate.  As previously noted, the guerrillas exhibit a marked preference for 
attacks over clashes.  Of course, when there is no opposing side fighting back the 
guerrillas are unlikely to suffer many casualties.  The government, on the other hand, 
strongly prefers clashes to attack.  For this reason figure 11 is much more favourable 
for the guerrillas relative to the government than is figure 10 with long-run casualty 
figures very similar for the two groups in the former picture.  Nevertheless, it is 
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apparent that since the beginning of the Uribe administration guerrilla casualties have 
been consistently above those of the government, with a declining trend for both 
series.  This is a rare and significant event in long-run perspective.  There has never 
before been a period of sustained relative losses for the guerrillas in the events in 
which they participate.  In fact, from mid 1997 until early 1999 the guerrillas were 
definitely getting the better of the government in events with guerrilla participation.15  
Finally, since clashes between the paramilitaries and the guerrillas have decreased 
markedly under Uribe, paramilitary casualties in figure 11 drop sharply.   
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Figure 11. Quarterly number of guerrilla-related casualties 
 
 The corresponding figure for the paramilitaries confirms all statements 
involving paramilitaries in the last two paragraphs without adding new insights so we 
do not provide it.  Instead, we give figure 12 that shows casualties by group in those 
                                                 
15 By this period the FARC had developed numerous large mobile companies and its longstanding 
preference for attacks over clashes was shifting in favour of clashes, as these FARC units we were 
overwhelming isolated Army bases.  Marks (2002) describes how the Colombian military was able to 
increase its own mobility and turn the tables against the FARC.  The use of airpower and aerial troop 
transport was fundamental for the successful response of the military to this challenge. 
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clashes in which the paramilitaries are involved, overwhelmingly clashes with the 
guerrillas.  Interestingly, a large number of civilians are also killed in these events.  
But the big story of the picture is the paramilitaries’ great ineffectiveness as a fighting 
force.  In all but one year the paramilitaries suffer more losses than they inflict on the 
guerrillas and paramilitary casualties are growing rapidly.  The recent trend toward 
more clashes with the government only compounds the paramilitaries’ problems.  
Even when they are not clashing with the government, the enhanced government 
presence in the Colombian countryside under the Democratic Security Policy is 
probably placing new restrictions on the paramilitaries’ freedom of movement.  Thus, 
the decline in paramilitary attacks and the paramilitaries’ willingness to enter 
demobilization talks with the government seems sensible.16 
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Figure 12. Annual number of paramilitary-related casualties during clashes 
 
                                                 
16 Another probable factor bringing the paramilitaries to the table is the US insistence that paramilitary 
leaders should be extradited to the US to face drug-trafficking charges.  It is likely that the 
paramilitaries  believe that the Uribe government might give them a better deal than its successor 
would and, in particular, might have the inclination and influence in Washington to allow them to 
avoid extradition.   
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7.   The FARC vs.  the ELN 
Figure 13 shows the series for both clashes and attacks for both the FARC and the 
ELN.  Both attack series show very sharp declines, indicating that this piece of good 
news about the guerrillas in general applies specifically to each of the two main sub-
groups.  Again we stress that the fighting technology of guerrilla groups relies heavily 
on sneak attacks while clashes are generally disadvantageous.  The number of clashes 
for both groups has decreased somewhat under Uribe, again reflecting the sharp 
decline of the paramilitaries.  But for the first time, the number of clashes has 
surpassed the number of attacks for both groups.  Note also that the ELN shows larger 
percentage decreases in both attacks and clashes relative to the FARC.  Indeed, the 
ELN has almost disappeared as an attacking force.  This continues a longer trend that 
began in 2000, two years after the death of Father Manuel Pérez, its able leader.   
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Figure 13. Guerrilla attacks plus clashes by group 
 
8.   Summary and Conclusion 
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Here, in brief, are our main findings.  Attacks by both the paramilitaries and guerrillas 
have dropped sharply back to their long-run averages for the whole Uribe period but 
substantially below these averages for the last three quarters of 2003.  Clashes 
involving paramilitaries have plummeted while those between the guerrillas and 
government forces are near all-time highs.  Total killing rates have decreased from 
their peak but remain well above long-run averages, masking a big divergence: 
civilian killing has dropped to even below the long-run average while combatant 
killing is at an all- time high.  Guerrilla attacks have brought injury rates to record 
levels, largely due to the increased use of antipersonnel mines and urban terrorism, 
but again there is a divergence: civilian injuries are running at an all-time high while 
combatant injuries conform to long-run averages.  Clashes have become increasingly 
lethal both for the guerrillas and for the paramilitaries.  The paramilitaries have been 
the biggest killers of civilians and the decrease in civilian killing is mainly tied to 
strongly diminished, but still not eliminated, paramilitary activity.  The paramilitaries 
are ineffective and getting worse in clashes.  The government has improved its 
casualty ratios relative to the guerrillas and has started to clash more with the 
paramilitaries.  FARC clashes with the government are near an all- time high but 
FARC attacks have dropped sharply.  The ELN is in continuous and strong decline, 
suggesting that the time is probably ripe to engage them in demobilization 
negotiations. 
 In short, most of the series show good or excellent progress with the civilian 
injury rate being a notable exception.  In the context of an ongoing and unsettled 
conflict, the combination of more lethal clashing with the FARC and less killing of 
civilians is ideal for Colombia, and the two phenomena are probably connected with 
each other.  Restrepo and Spagat (2004) provides statistical evidence based on our 
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data set that paramilitary attacks increase when there is a combination of infrequent 
government clashes and frequent guerrilla attacks.  In other words, paramilitary 
activity substitutes for government activity so when the government becomes more 
aggressive the paramilitaries tend to decrease their attacks.  Thus, it is no accident that 
the government taking the offensive in the war is saving lives, even in the short run.  
Of course, even more lives might be saved if in the long run the government offensive 
leads the guerrillas to negotiate earnestly for peace.   
 Such progress could not have been taken for granted in 2002.  For example, 
Sweig (2002, p.1) argued that “If clear and tough demands are not put on the 
Colombian military and political elite to double tax revenues, double the defense 
budget, cut ties to the paramilitaries, send their sons to fight, return the internally 
displaced to their homes, and to enact other reforms, Colombia’s precipitous decline 
will only continue.”  In fact, without such outside pressure Colombian democracy 
delivered a government that has prosecuted the war with a determination and success 
that nobody considered possible in August, 2002.   
 Despite the abundant good news, we observe in some circles a puzzling 
reluctance to acknowledge any recent improvements.  In fact, there is a definite 
tendency to treat the Colombian government as an international pariah regime.17  We 
suggest that admitting the existence of some real achievements should be a test of 
good faith for the critics of Uribe’s policies.  Much government policy is certainly 
open to criticism.  For example, one might question the demobilization negotiations 
with the paramilitaries as possibly leading to impunity for grossly violent offenders.  
Or one might question the policy of mass detentions of suspected guerrilla supporters 
as a violation of human rights as the Colombian Procurator General has recently done 
                                                 
17 There was much commentary along these lines during Uribe’s February, 2004 visit to Europe 
together with vigorous protests and boycotts by some MEPs (El Tiempo, February 9-15).  
Representative of this point of view in English is Hilton (2004). 
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(El Tiempo, 2004b).  Perhaps some analysts can make a persuasive case that the gains 
of Uribe’s year and a half will eventually be reversed under the pressure of various 
slow-acting mistakes with possible legitimacy and military costs for the government.   
 We believe that some caution is in order.  We stress that paramilitary and 
guerrilla attacks over the whole Uribe period have only moved back to their historical 
averages.  It seems unlikely that military performance against the guerrillas has really 
improved to the point where a final defeat of the FARC is a near-term possibility.  In 
fact, Marcella (2003) argues that the Colombian military is far from the superiority it 
would need to really win the war.  Moreover, just sustaining present policies to 
consolidate the gains made against illegal groups will present a fiscal challenge after a 
series of tax hikes and expenditure cuts have already been used to finance a 
continuous military budget expansion.  Casual inspection of our pictures suggests 
some degree of cyclicality in war intensity, suggesting that a new guerrilla offensive 
is not only possible, but likely.  So whether the positive trends of Uribe’s first year 
can be maintained remains an open question. 
 In fact, we perceive a danger that high expectations encouraged by recent 
successes might become a liability in the future.  Over the next two years many 
people both in Colombia and abroad might become frustrated if the war has not 
clearly entered an endgame process.  Our statistics do not suggest that the FARC has 
already begun a terminal decline.  Maybe over the next few years war indicators will 
continue their rapid improvement.  Or maybe they will simply get stuck near their 
long-run averages as complacency replaces the urgency of the present.  Colombia has 
accomplished much within a short period of time but still faces a long and tough road 
forward.  But for the moment the gains are there for all to see and should be 
acknowledged. 
 30 
Bibliography 
 
Amnesty International, (2003) “AI Report 2003: Colombia”, 
http://web.amnesty.org/report2003/Col-summary-eng. 
Center for International Policy, (2004) “US aid to Colombia since 1997: Summary 
Tables”, http://ciponline.org/colombia/aidtable.htm 
Colombian Platform for Human Rights, Democracy and Development, (2004) The 
Authoritarian Spell: Álvaro Uribe Vélez First year of Government, Bogotá, 
http://www.plataforma-colombiana.org/ 
Comisión Colombiana de Juristas, (2003) “Alerta Frente a las Cifras de Derechos 
Humanos en Colombia”, Bogotá, 
http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/030709ccj.htm#_ftn2 
Comité Permanente por la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos, (2003) “Carta de los 
abogados defensores de derechos humanos, amenazados al presidente de la 
República”, Bogotá, http://cpdh.free.fr/todo.htm. 
Council on Foreign Relations, (2004) Andes 2020: A New Strategy for the Challenges 
of Colombia and the Region, Washington: Council on Foreign Relations. 
Cragin, K. and B. Hoffman, (2003) “Arms trafficking and Colombia”, Santa Monica 
CA: The Rand Corporation, http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1468. 
El Colombiano,  (2004) “Denuncian más 600 asesinatos las autodefensas durante alto 
fuego”, 13 February.   
El Tiempo (2004a) “Antonio Navarro denunció que paramilitares violan cese al fuego 
y ya mataron a 600 personas”, January 29.   
El Tiempo, (2004b) “Procurador reporta falta de órdenes de captura y violación de 
garantías en detenciones masivas”, February 24. 
High Commissioner for Peace, (2004) Balance of the Cessation of Hostilities 
December 2002- December 2003, Bogotá, 
http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/noticias/2004/febrero/dic_02_03
_eng.htm 
Hilton, I., (2004) “A president who wants a licence to kill”, The Guardian, February 
10. 
Human Rights Watch, (2004) “Colombia: briefing to the 60th session of the UN 
Commission for Human Rights, 
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/01/29/colomb7124.htm. 
ICG, (2003) “Colombia: President Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy”, International 
Crisis Group, November 13.   
Invamer-Gallup (2004) Quarterly Gallup Poll, March, Bogotá. 
Isacson, A.  (2003) “Was Failure Avoidable? Learning from Colombia’s 1998-2002 
Peace Process, Dante B.  Fascell North-South Center Working Paper Series 
#14, University of Miami. 
Marcella, G., (2003) “The United States and Colombia: The journey from ambiguity 
to strategic clarity” Strategic  Studies Institute, U.S.  Army War College. 
 31 
Marks, Thomas, (2002) “Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency,” 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.  Army War College. 
Nuñez, Joseph R., (2001) “Fighting the Hobbesian Trinity in Colombia: A New 
Strategy for Peace,” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.  Army War College. 
O’Grady, M., A., (2004) “Cooking the Human-Rights Books in Colombia,” The Wall 
Street Journal Online, February 6. 
Pizarro, E., (2003a) “A New Approach: Álvaro Uribe’s Democratic Security Project”, 
Inter-American Dialogue Working Paper, July. 
Pizarro, E., (2003b) “De paramilitares y otras hierbas”, unpublished manuscript. 
Posada, E., (2001) Civil War? The Language of Conflict in Colombia, Bogotá: 
Fundación Ideas para la Paz. 
Presidency of the Republic of Colombia and Ministry of Defence, (2003) Democratic 
Security and Defence Policy, Bogotá, 
http://www.mindefensa.gov.co/politica/documentos/seguridad_democratica_e
ng.pdf 
Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk, (2001) “Colombian Labyrinth,” Rand, Santa Monica, 
CA. 
Restrepo, J and M.  Spagat, (2004) "Government Armies, Paramilitary Organizations 
and Guerilla Warfare,” unpublished manuscript. 
Restrepo, J, M.  Spagat and J.  Vargas, (2003) “The Dynamics of the Colombian civil 
conflict”, forthcoming in Homo Oeconomicus. 
Safford, F.  and M.  Palacios, (2002) Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Spencer, D.  (2001), “Colombia’s paramilitaries: criminals of political force?” 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.  Army War College Working Paper. 
Sweig, Julia E., (2002) “What Kind of War for Colombia,” Foreign Affairs, 81, 5, 
122-142. 
United States Institute of Peace, (2004) “Civil society under siege in Colombia”, 
special report 114, http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr114.html. 
Villelabeitia, Ibon, (2004) “Colombia right-wing militias breach cease-fire –UN”, 
Reuters, February 13. 
WOLA, (2003) “WOLA deplores Uribe’s attack on human rights defenders”, 
http://www.wola.org/Colombia/press_release_uribeattacks_eng.htm. 
